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Abstract. The usage of complex Microcontroller Units (MCUs) in avionic
systems constitutes a challenge in assuring their safety. They are not
developed according to the development requirements accepted by the
aerospace industry. These Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware
components usually target other domains like the telecommunication
branch. In the last years MCUs developed in compliance to the ISO
26262 have been released on the market for safety-related automotive ap-
plications. The avionic assurance process could profit from these safety
MCUs. In this paper we present evaluation results based on the cur-
rent assurance practice that demonstrates expected assurance activities
benefit from ISO 26262 compliant MCUs.
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1 Introduction
COTS hardware components are ubiquitous in Airborne Electronic Hardware
(AEH) and were considered in the very beginning of the RTCA/DO-254 [1].
However, the complexity of the desired COTS components is continuously in-
creasing, even for highly safety-critical functions. Certification authorities ad-
dress this rapid evolution by delegation of research activities and provision of
further guidance in COTS hardware component assurance for different types
of components (e.g. MCUs or graphics processing units). The aim is to deliver
advisory material as specific as possible for industrial practice. COTS hardware
component assurance and Design Assurance (DA) of AEH have the same objec-
tive, which is to assure that a hardware component safely performs as intended
in its operational context. But the method is inevitably distinct because of the
nature that COTS hardware components were not developed according to the
RTCA/DO-254 or that COTS manufacturers do not disclose required develop-
ment artefacts to be able to demonstrate compliance afterwards. So process-
based evidence of the design life cycle cannot be claimed as aircraft systems
concerns were not regarded during the development of the COTS product.
Avionic manufacturers employ components actually intended for other do-
mains3. Hardware with a long market availability and operable under harsh
environmental conditions is requested. These component properties are char-
acteristic for the automotive domain. Functional safety is at least since 2011,
where the ISO 26262 standard [2] has been released, a major concern for Origi-
nal Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and also many suppliers for automotive
parts like integrated circuits. MCUs developed in compliance with ISO 26262 are
designed for safety-critical applications. For their development the ISO 26262
describes an approach called Safety Element out of Context (SEooC). Semicon-
ductor manufacturers are able to create a product that can be integrated into
different systems or operational contexts. AEH manufacturers observe the situ-
ation in the automotive and other safety-critical domains that request hardware
components according to standards that are aimed to reduce or control the risk
of hazardous failures [3].Their aim is to exploit the fact that safety plays an
essential role in more and more sectors and to influence the product lines of
hardware component manufacturers that produce in high quantities.
As a consequence of the current situation, the following research question
arises: How can the avionics industry benefit from this situation in the course
of COTS hardware components assurance? To answer this question, the paper
is structured as following: Section 2 describes how assurance is achieved for
avionic systems in general and how it differs if complex MCUs shall be embedded.
Evaluation of ISO 26262 compliant MCU benefit in COTS hardware component
assurance is performed in section 3. Conclusions are given in the last section.
2 Assurance Methods for Avionics
The meaning of the concept of assurance varies in its understanding depending
on the context and which aspects should be assured. The following sections give
a brief overview of this topic in the avionics domain and distinguish between
two aspects. First, these are avionic systems that mainly comprise components
manufactured alongside the avionic development life cycle and second avionic
systems that make use of complex MCUs. In both cases sufficient and practical
assurance methods have to be performed.
2.1 Development Assurance
The term assurance methods is currently often used in the avionics domain [4,5,6].
In general, assurance can be defined as the actions that provide appropriate
3 For Development Assurance Level (DAL) A applications the general principle is to
restrict the use of complex components.
confidence and evidence that a product or process meets its requirements [7].
Assurance intends to reduce the uncertainty about the correct realisation of the
product. It delivers reasons why the confidence on achieving the claim is so jus-
tifiable [8] and why most assurance activities target the establishment of this
confidence [9]. In a requirements-based product development this means, that
the requirements specification meets the real-world needs (validation of require-
ments) and that the product is a correct implementation of the requirements
specification (verification of requirements).
For avionic systems the airworthiness requirements [10] are on the top of their
requirements specification. Summarized, it has to be assured that the avionic
system design is appropriate for the intended function and that its function is
provided as defined in its operational context (environmental and operating con-
ditions of the aeroplane). These are prerequisites to ensure that it is extremely
improbable that safety-critical AEH contributes to a catastrophic failure condi-
tion at aircraft level that harms human life. For safety-critical systems, assurance
methods are necessary to deliver enough credit to justifiably state that the sys-
tem is safe in its context4.
This is very challenging if the system is too complex in order to provide the
requested level of confidence by exhaustive tests which fully characterise the sys-
tem. Hence, the method of Design Assurance was defined to cope with this issue
in different areas, system [11,7]5, software [12] and hardware [1] development.
These DA areas aim to accomplish the development in a sufficiently rigorous and
disciplined way so that development errors do not impact safety [13]. DA is char-
acterised by techniques that are applied during the whole development process in
order to identify and correct errors that could occur at various steps within the
development life cycle. This comprises assurance techniques like process assur-
ance, verification coverage criteria and reviews. In addition, for the two highest
development assurance levels, RTCA/DO-254 requires additional development
assurance activities to be performed, i.e. it is not sufficient to show evidence that
a certain design process has been followed alone. RTCA/DO-254 suggests using
architectural mitigation techniques, service experience and advanced verification
methods as additional development assurance activities.
For AEH embedded MCUs, DA on device level cannot be claimed or used as
assurance method [14]. The reason is that most DA techniques are based on an
ongoing development and the accessibility of development-time artefacts down to
a level detailed enough to realize the hardware component and assure its safety
aspects. For MCUs this is not possible as the development has already been
accomplished and detailed development-time artefacts are not available. Thus,
other assurance methods have to be determined which can reduce uncertainty
in a similar magnitude creditable by the certification authorities.
4 For non-safety-critical systems other properties e.g. security are in the focus of as-
surance methods.
5 The safety assessment is part of development assurance to deliver the safety require-
ments and support the confidence of its verification.
2.2 COTS Hardware Component Assurance
As stated in [15], it is very challenging to define an assurance method for COTS
hardware components in an objective way. Two aspects have to be considered
for the objectivity: The method is applicable for a variety of components and
following it delivers results that can be fairly assessed by the authorities. Such
guidance shall support the industry in realization of certifiable AEH, embedded
with COTS components, in a practical way so that certification costs do not
explode and safety can be sufficiently assured.
The latest initiatives by authorities in this direction resulted in the following
documents6 and reflect the status quo:
– EASA:
• Certification memorandum CM SWCEH-001: Development Assurance
of Airborne Electronic Hardware [16].
This document represents the current attitude of the EASA about several
certification aspects of AEH and in section 9 especially to COTS MCUs. The
content is based on experience in COTS hardware component assurance in
many certification projects gathered in the years before and funded research
activities as [17].
– FAA:
• Commercial Off-The-Shelf Airborne Electronic Hardware Assurance Meth-
ods - Phase 3 - Embedded Controllers [4].
• Assurance of Multicore Processors in Airborne Systems [18].
These technical reports are the results of funded research by the FAA to
develop proposals for assurance approaches for different COTS hardware.
Notable is that for different hardware component categories (e.g. multicore
processors or microcontrollers) the assurance methods were separately consid-
ered. This faces the fact, that each technology has its own issues which shall
be incorporated to provide methods that are useful in practice. Especially small
companies and market newcomers are interested in guidelines as concrete as pos-
sible since they do not have the same amount of development experience as the
larger ones [19].
All reports listed above share one similarity: COTS assurance should be man-
aged from system level in parallel or within the AEH design process7. However,
they lack in formulating a framework that brings them all together in a coherent
approach that could be related as an deployable COTS hardware component as-
surance process. From these reports, the EASA certification memorandum can
be considered as most relevant to identify necessary COTS assurance tasks. It
represents the current position of a certification authority and defines assurance
activities as an Electronic Component Management Plan (ECMP)8 extension.
6 None of these listed documents are binding guidance material.
7 Recommended also by RTCA/DO-254.
8 The term ECMP in the memorandum is misleading because typically such a process
does not perform profound functional assurance activities.
FAAs research report [4] does not explicitly cover activities but has identified
issues to keep track of during assurance. Also, findings and recommendations can
be found in this research report. Some similar to the activities in EASAs CM,
e.g. usage domain analysis, integration aspects, errata handling, and configura-
tion management, and some similar to typical ISO 26262 implementations, e.g.
robustness verification. These issues, findings and recommendations have been
analysed but were not identified as obvious COTS assurance tasks and therefore
not included in this paper. In addition, the other FAA research report [18] con-
cerns multicore processors running in parallel and not in synchronized lock-step
mode (LSM). For the case study in this paper, all ISO 26262 developed MCUs
must be run in LSM for safety-critical applications. Report [18] is therefore not
included in the analysis of this paper.
The memorandum contains sixteen recommended activities, numbered with
brackets from 1 to 16 (e.g. Activity [1]). These activities are referenced in this
article with the same numbering but are emphasized in round brackets instead
to avoid confusion with other references in the article. These activities should be
considered depending on the DAL associated by a higher level safety assessment,
the magnitude of Product Service Experience (PSE) traceable from different
domains and the complexity of the MCU. In the subsequent text, activities are
discussed for DAL A which apply for components with the highest possible safety
impact. This will extend the value of scope of this article, because targeting DAL
A means that all activities have to be conducted if the PSE is inadequate. The
argumentation behind these additional assurance activities is not further stated
in the document but is essential for the understanding on how they contribute
to COTS hardware component assurance. Thus the assumed argumentation was
reconstructed.
Two top arguments were extracted that have to be assured:
Argument 1 The component performs as described by the manufacturer with-
out anomalous behaviour.
Argument 2 The component as used satisfies the AEH requirements.
It has to be differentiated between those arguments as the MCU was not devel-
oped according to the requirements of the AEH. How these arguments can be
supported depends on the complexity of the COTS component. For MCUs with
a functional architecture classified as simple, the arguments can be fulfilled as
following:
– Argument 1:
• Verification of component behaviour on device level as specified by the
manufacturer.
The simplicity of the COTS component allows to verify all requirements
on the physical device.
• Substantiate the confidence of a design free from anomalous behaviour
by demonstrating device maturity or quality.
Most of the confidence on device quality is already supported by the com-
prehensive verification effort. However, additional errata management in
activity (6) and (7) shall be considered to state that the device design
is stable enough. This can be demonstrated by errata decreasing over
the service time on the market. Also the errata publishing policy of the
manufacturer shall be adequate to be always informed about revealed
problems and to achieve that errata with potential safety impacts can
be handled.
– Argument 2:
• Verification of AEH requirements on Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) or
Circuit Board Assembly (CBA) level during equipment design.
• As requested by certification requirements, no single point of failure
should lead to a catastrophic failure condition. This is also valid for
COTS components in general. Activity (15) requests the implementa-
tion of an adequate architectural mitigation technique like dissimilar
redundancy or monitoring.
• An ECMP e.g. as described in IEC TS62239.
Most of the available MCUs on the market are complex or even highly com-
plex components. For these devices, exhaustive tests on device level can not
be achieved to adequately substantiate argument 1 as for simple components.
Therefore additional activities for complex or highly complex hardware are nec-
essary, which are depicted as following for argument 1 and 2:
– Argument 1:
• Verification of component behaviour on device level as specified by the
manufacturer.
The concept of usage domain as described in activity (4) resp. (5) is
suggested to bound the scope of device level verification only on compo-
nent behaviour that is relied on or is really used. The determined usage
domain shall be compliant to the manufacturer recommendations and
verified on device level. If the MCU is part of a partitioning concept, an
analysis has to be performed as described in activity (16) to claim the
robustness of this mechanism at device level9.
• Substantiate the confidence of a design free from anomalous behaviour
by demonstrating device maturity or quality.
The verification on device level limited to usage domain aspects is not
enough to mainly support argument 1. In comparison to simple COTS
components, the correct behaviour assumption of complex hardware is
more based on other activities like:
∗ COTS manufacturer quality management and production process
has to be assessed in activity (3).
∗ Errata management as for simple components in activity (6) and
(7). Additionally, activity (8) requests that the AEH manufacturer
has to document own made experience with the hardware during the
development (e.g. errata workarounds).
9 Actually, we consider partitioning aspects as a specific part of the usage domain
analysis, because MCU properties shall be verified on device level.
∗ Manufacturers configuration management including a change pro-
cess has to be assessed in activity (9) to make sure that changes
are appropriately controlled and communicated. Activity (10) addi-
tionally requests a change impact analysis to identify potential extra
verification effort.
∗ The PSE has to be documented by activity (13) in order to determine
if it is sufficient10to omit certain assurance activities. Specifically for
DAL A and B, a minimum amount of PSE has to be reported in order
to exclude really novel designs to be embedded in AEH systems.
Activity (14) further increases the confidence on the maturity and
stability of the MCU by requesting evidence on the rate and fact of
past modifications.
– Argument 2:
• Usage domain validation in activity (5) ensures that the usage domain
is consistent to system, software and hardware requirements.
• For complex COTS it is not sufficient to verify requirements allocated
to the MCU at equipment level as for simple components. Activity (11)
requests verification and validation of these requirements coming from
other hardware or software components on device level in order to get
confidence about its correct integration.
• For highly complex MCUs activity (12) has to be conducted to have a
clear understanding of possible device failure modes and rates depending
on its configuration.
• Architectural mitigation technique as requested by activity (15) shall
also be applied.
• An ECMP e.g. as described in IEC TS 62239 [20].
Activity (1) and (2) were not mapped to a top argument, since determining or
classifying the MCU characteristic (1) and archiving public available device
data (2) are required for both top arguments. It does not matter if the MCU
is classified as simple, complex or highly complex.
All these explained assurance activities of the certification memorandum are only
applicable for the peripheral subsystem and other functions which are not part
of the processing core. The DA of the processing core is based on the software
development process compliant to RTCA/DO-178 that includes software testing
on the target hardware platform. This separation is based on the assumption
that other MCU functions do not interfere with the software execution on the
processing core [4].
The explanations about complex COTS hardware component assurance es-
tablished the basis on which in the next section the potential benefits from ISO
26262 compliant complex MCUs can be examined.
10 The metric to determine a PSE as sufficient is also defined in the certification mem-
orandum.
3 Benefits from ISO 26262 compliant MCUs in AEH
COTS Assurance
The research question asked in the introduction was: How can the avionics in-
dustry benefit from ISO 26262 compliant MCUs in the course of COTS hard-
ware components assurance? Before starting to evaluate an ISO 26262 compliant
MCU against the assurance approach from section 2.2, the differences to other
MCUs on the market have to be identified first. What makes these MCUs so
special? These are the aspects on which COTS assurance can probably profit in
comparison to other MCUs e.g. from the telecommunication domain.
3.1 Determination of ISO 26262 specifics for reuse
The special characteristics of interest come from the development approach de-
fined by the process requirements from ISO 26262. During previous research we
made a comparison between the DA method of RTCA/DO-254 and ISO 26262-
511, which concludes that the ISO 26262 does not reach the same level of design
integrity [21]12. The reason is that only safety requirements are considered in
the development life cycle of the MCU, whereas the traceability down to de-
tailed design level is not required. For manufacturers the main focus is on the
safety architecture to handle random hardware failures by adequate safety mech-
anisms to achieve the targeted diagnostic coverage and to be able to enter a safe
state if necessary or indicate failures to external components. Thus, the main
focus is not on systematic errors13, which is the main focus for designs following
RTCA/DO-254. On the device level the characteristic of a very high diagnostic
coverage makes these products something special on the market and manufac-
turers are very encouraged in the realization and verification of the MCU’s safety
architecture.
The MCU development approach has to adhere to ISO 26262-5 and refer-
enced parts. ISO 26262-10:2012 does not define conformance requirements but
gives guidance especially on MCU development. It explains the SEooC method
and describes in appendix A how it could be applied for MCUs. This concept al-
lows the realization of a component like an MCU which is deployable to different
application contexts: it is built for reuse. Therefore the manufacturer first as-
sumes the safety requirements that could be allocated from the system level and
architecture around the component. These assumptions are necessary to develop
the MCU internal safety architecture. The system integrator has to follow the
manufacturers assumptions and recommendations to preserve the integrity of the
MCU safety architecture in the final system context. For ISO 26262 compliant
MCUs typically an additional document type is released in order to inform the
11 Part five of the standard is about product development at the hardware level.
12 This demonstrates reasonableness of a dedicated COTS assurance process see section
2.2.
13 ISO 26262 implicitly addresses systematic errors for hardware through the develop-
ment process.
integrator about the ISO 26262 related information essential for system integra-
tion activities: the safety manual or safety application note. In ISO 26262-10:2012
section A.3.10 an example on the content of the safety manual is given.
As only suggestions for the safety manual content is provided, it still worth
to examine which aspects have been realized in published documents. In order to
assess the potential benefits of the safety manual in an avionic COTS component
assurance process, the content of a representative probe of three manuals from
three different vendors was analysed. The selected MCUs target ISO 26262 Au-
tomotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) D. They have been selected to increase
the value of the scope of this article and not if they are really suitable for the
avionics industry. Thus, no analysis has been performed to check the suitability
of these devices for avionics due to e.g. cosmic radiation or other environmental
or functional issues such as correct set of interfaces. The selected MCUs with
respective safety manuals are: NXP MPC5744P [22], ST SPC56ELx [23] and TI
TMS570LC4x [24]. The content analysis of these manuals resulted in the follow-
ing two major topics of interest that can be found in each of the examined safety
manual in different level of detail:
– MCU safety architecture: It describes how random hardware fault manage-
ment is separated between internal hardware diagnostics and additional soft-
ware diagnostics. The examined MCUs employ a three layered approach:
1. All hardware blocks required for software execution are equipped with
the highest degree of diagnostic coverage by hardware safety mechanisms.
Two cores operate in delayed lock step and data transfers between mem-
ory and the processing cores are protected by end-to-end error-correcting
code. This shall assure, that the software execution is not impacted by
random hardware faults.
2. Based on the integrity of software execution, peripheral functions are
mainly assured by software safety mechanism e.g. informational redun-
dancy on application layer protocols.
3. Debug functions should not be used in an operational safety-related sys-
tem, thus no diagnostics are provided and recommended respectively.
Worst case fault recognition times of hardware diagnostics are stated to-
gether with the failure indication and handling by entering safe states of the
MCU.
– Hardware and software requirements on system level: Here the assumptions
are explained which have to be followed by the system integrator. Hardware
requirements define the functionality of external hardware safety mechanism
like supervision of the power supply. Software requirements describe the
correct way to utilize the internal hardware safety mechanisms and how
software could improve the diagnostic coverage depending on the used MCU
hardware functions in the safety-related system.
The avionic manufacturer could benefit from the same aspects as the automo-
tive system integrator: At first from the ISO 26262 certified development process
of the manufacturer and the process-requirements documented in the ISO 26262
respectively. At second, the additional information from the safety manual may
be used. It can be assumed that the AEH supplier may get further support from
the MCU manufacturer only in a limited scope, if necessary. However, these are
the only public available information that can be additionally reused in partic-
ular for ISO 26262 compliant MCUs in the COTS assurance evaluation process
described in the next section.
3.2 COTS Component Assurance of ISO 26262 compliant MCUs
In section 2.2, COTS assurance activities were outlined on the basis of rec-
ommendations from [16] for simple and complex/highly complex MCUs. The
presented selection of ISO 26262 compliant MCUs in section 3.1 cannot be clas-
sified as simple14 and MCUs aiming at an even lower ASIL level like ASIL A or
B are often based on more complex architectures. For that reason and to exam-
ine all benefits from the ISO compliance statement for every assurance activity,
a classification of highly complex is assumed. The COTS component assurance
activities have to be conducted by the AEH supplier and some of them are
achievable with minimal or no additional support by the MCU manufacturer.
These activities have to be excluded from the evaluation because they can be
accomplished with MCUs in general and to claim these as ISO 26262 specific
benefits would falsify the assessment results. Thus the following activities were
omitted from the evaluation:
– (1) Describing the COTS component characteristics in order to classify the
MCU as simple/complex/highly complex is feasible on basis of the usual
public available hardware documentation.
– (2) Archiving of collected device data like errata notes or user manuals can
be performed without help of the MCU manufacturer
– (5) For usage the domain validation (part of activity (5)), the avionic system
developer is responsible. Validation means, that a determined usage domain
has to be checked if they do not contradict any higher level requirements
from system/hardware/software. It is like requirements validation, to check
if a low level requirement is a valid refinement of a higher level requirement.
The COTS component manufacturer is not required for that task.
– (8) Documentation of past experience made with the MCU during the AEH
development shall substantiate the robustness and maturity in the field. The
MCU manufacturers are not involved in this action.
– (15) Architectural mitigation techniques addressing common modes on de-
vice level. They are implemented during system development and are on a
higher level than the MCU itself15. No additional support for this work can
be requested from COTS component manufacturers.
14 It is assumed that the full functional scope of the MCU is used and in that case it
will be not practical to verify it on that extent on device level.
15 Note that on-chip MCU architectural mitigation techniques cannot be credited for
common mode issues.
Table 1 gives an overview of the evaluation results. The considered assurance
activities can make use of additional MCU artefacts in particular. They are as-
signed according to the identified top level arguments of section 2.2 and arranged
in two groups resp.: Yes if a COTS component assurance activity benefits from
the ISO 26262 compliance statement and no if that is not the case.
Table 1: Evaluation Results Overview
Top Level Argument Assurance Activity Benefits by ISO 26262
1. The component performs
as described by the
manufacturer without
anomalous behaviour.
(3): Quality management and production
No
(13),(14): PSE
(4), (5), (16)16: Usage domain
Yes(6), (7): Errata management
(9), (10): Configuration management
2. The component as used
satisfies the AEH
requirements.
(11), (12): Integration Yes
For argument 1 no benefits can be directly asserted for activity (3), (13) and
(14). Quality management and production process requirements in (3) can not
be claimed to be defined by the ISO 26262. However, in a comprehensive ISO
26262 assessment process by a third party these aspects should also be checked.
Activity (13) and (14) require the documentation of the PSE. The ISO 26262
also introduces a proven in use argument to claim a sufficient safety integrity,
but no activities are defined that the MCU manufacturer has to document the
usage of their products in the automotive field. It is notable, that MCU us-
age in the automotive safety critical sector is creditable if it can be adequately
demonstrated.
The determination (4) and verification (5) of the usage domain profits from
detailed data descriptions in the safety manuals including disabling on chip
functions, test of activated functions, implementation hints, mandatory require-
ments, assumptions, and initial configurations. Safety mechanisms described in
the safety manual can also be utilized in usage domain verification tasks. Taking
into account errata documents during system integration is demanded in the
examined safety manual [22,23,24]. They are published and sufficiently prepared
in order to allow the system integrator to determine possible safety implica-
tions. Therefore, the errata management activities (6) and (7) should have an
advantage by using a ISO 26262 compliant MCU. Assurance activities (9) and
(10) request an adequate configuration management or change description ap-
proach by the MCU manufacturer and additional change impact analysis by the
AEH developer. According to ISO 26262 part 8 a configuration management and
change management plan shall be provided by the MCU manufacturer. In the
safety manuals or errata documents the applicable device revision or product
16 Partitioning considerations were allocated to the usage domain analysis.
configurations are clearly stated. It is therefore assumed that COTS manufac-
turers configuration management is available and in good shape.
For argument 2 table 1 shows less assurance which activities benefit from
an ISO 26262 compliant MCU. Actually, most AEH requirements are already
determined and verified on device level in activity (4) and (5). Usage domain
determination is a mapping of AEH requirements on basis of the adequate con-
figuration and usage of the MCU. So the actual function and properties on device
level designed by the manufacturer are reused as AEH requirements. In activity
(11) AEH requirements from a higher level like LRU or CBA level allocated to
the component have to be verified and validated. The device level description
in the safety manual for I/O functions and software requirements may help in
the validation and verification process for correct integration of the device. The
assurance activity (12) demands a clear understanding of possible device failure
modes and rates depending on its configuration. The safety manuals will help in
this activity. Several failure scenarios are covered in these documents and failure
rate calculations are one of the main topic of ISO 26262 hardware development.
4 Conclusion
In this article an insight was given in the differences of assurance approaches for
AEH especially when equipped with complex COTS MCUs. Based on [16] a new
structured overview was presented for the COTS hardware component assurance
activities. Currently, no industry consensus standard or recommendation from
certification authorities is available that brings all necessary COTS assurance as-
pects together in an integrated approach [15]. Therefore the presented assurance
activities are supposedly not complete. However, the selected assurance activ-
ities provide an adequate foundation for the evaluation of possible benefits of
ISO 26262 compliant MCUs during the assurance process. Specifics of ISO 26262
compliant MCUs were described to identify the aspects that could be reused. The
evaluation concentrates on assurance activities where additional support by the
MCU manufacturer is most helpful. It could be demonstrated that an ISO 26262
compliant MCU is beneficial for the AEH manufacturer by conducting certain
assurance activities. However, the magnitude of these advantages depend on the
dedicated context in which the MCU should be integrated.
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